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The Genealogy of Public Choice Theory

Articles in Press

Document Type : Article

Authors

1 Ph.D student in public law, faculty of law, shahid beheshty university, Tehran, Iran

2 Assistant Professor in Economic Law, faculty of law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

10.22059/jplsq.2025.393690.3742

Abstract

Public choice theory, as a branch of political economy, examines collective decision-making through the analytical tools of economics. It extends market-based rational choice models to non-market political and legal institutions. This paper adopts a descriptive-analytical method and utilizes library sources to trace the historical trajectory and theoretical development of public choice theory. While some of its conceptual roots can be identified in the late 18th century, its systematic formulation emerged in the mid-20th century, particularly in the United States. Despite the foundational ties between political economy and legal academia, economists have played a dominant role in the consolidation of this theory. Initially, public choice theory challenged idealistic notions of democracy and voting by introducing more skeptical, utility-based interpretations of political behavior. Over time, its scope expanded to cover government institutions, bureaucratic behavior, budgetary processes, and regulatory systems. By the late 20th century, the theory became central to the economic analysis of politics, evolving beyond the binary logic of two-party systems to account for multiparty dynamics. This expansion introduced new analytical dimensions, such as the structure and quality of political coalitions and the predictability of their outcomes.

Keywords

Main Subjects

References

  1. انگلیسی

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    French

    1. A) Livres
    2. de Borda, J. C. (1781). Memoire sur les Elections au Scrutin. Paris: Histoire de l’Academie Royale des Sciences.
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    References In Persian:

    1. A) Books
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    1. B) Articles
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    1. C) Thesis
    2. Rezaei, Mohammad Javad. (2010). A Comparative Analysis of Government Failure from the Perspective of Islamic Economics and Public Choice School. A. Thesis, Imam Sadiq University (In Persian).
Public Law Studies Quarterly

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 20 February 2027
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History
  • Receive Date: 26 April 2025
  • Revise Date: 19 July 2025
  • Accept Date: 04 August 2025
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