Document Type : Article


1 PhD in International Law, Science and Research Unit, Islamic Azad University, Isfahan, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Law Department, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

3 Associate Professor, Law Faculty, Islamic Azad University, Najaf Abad Branch, Najaf Abad, Iran


The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, whether naturaly or designed in biological laboratories with strategic goals, is an alarm bell in regard to biological threats. Extensive development of biological sciences and the possibility of genetic manipulations remind us of the possibility of genocide and generational abuse, and the increasing threats of bio-terrorism intensify this concern. This demonstrates the necessity  to strengthen the universal efforts for the destruction of biological weapons and their agents. The main obligations under the biological weapons prohibition system are outlined in the 1972 Convention on Prevention of Biological Weapons (BWC). But the lack of oversight by the monitoring body, as well as the lack of sufficient and independent guarantees to monitor violations of obligations, have made the effect of its function impaired and ambiguous. Identifying biological scientists, compiling codes of conduct and limiting terrorists access are among the strategies that can be made possible only in a new multilateral and comprehensive instrumentt which includes provision of an independent international monitoring body and sufficient guarantees.


  1. English

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