Document Type : Article

Authors

1 PhD in International Law, Science and Research Unit, Islamic Azad University, Isfahan, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Law Department, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

3 Associate Professor, Law Faculty, Islamic Azad University, Najaf Abad Branch, Najaf Abad, Iran

10.22059/jplsq.2020.305081.2487

Abstract

After the worldwide outbreak of Covid-19, whether coming from the laboratories of biology with strategic purposes or caused by natural factors, has become an alarm in the context of serious biological threat. Extensive advances on the biological sciences and recent genetic changes, might come to mind possible biological genocide. This demonstrates that it is necessary to strengthen the universal efforts in destruction of biological weapons and their agents. The 1972 Convention on Prevention of Biological Weapons (BWC) has provide the most obligations for States but this Convention has not established a supervisory body, has no sufficient and separate safeguards in monitoring non-observance of the Convention by the parties, and does not include violating States as non-parties. Codification of conduct for scientists in the field of biology, restrict access areas by terrorist actors are strategies that merely possible through a new and comprehensive document.

Keywords

  1. English

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