Document Type : Article
Authors
1 Associate Prof., Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
2 . A. in International Trade Economic Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
Nowadays, private banks are accepted as issuers of securities in the stock exchange market which accordingly, capital market and money market both interact in the form of exchange-traded banks. In public law, we seek to maintain comprehensive order and stability of money market. therefore, it is important to examine the banking system maintaining systemic stability and on the other hand, the capital market requirements are based on the transparency and protection of the shareholders’ rights through disclosure of information. We consider banks as a very special corporation because there is a connection between public trust and banks. It seems that the supervising authorities expect the transparency of all banks according to the regulations, but considering the remarkable influence of banks in the society at the intended time, it is better to hesitate more about the public disclosure of the data of banks that can impair the public trust of the society and endanger the system stability. Additionally, just like the EU that has accepted optimization and postponement in disclosure of bank information in the market abuse regulations for the sake of stability, we can pass some regulations and while accepting the disclosure of information in the interest of shareholders in the capital market, give some special treatment to banks in the case of disclosure of information for the sake of systemic stability and avoiding systemic risk in the banking sector. In the capital market of Iran, in recent years, we have observed filing some complaints against the bank managers by the capital market regulatory authorities while ignoring the prudential and stability concerns of central bank in maintaining systemic stability.
Keywords
- Systemic Stability
- Shareholders’ Rights
- Transparency
- Conflict between Capital Market and Money Market Regulations
- Conflict between Shareholders’ Rights and Depositors’ Rights
- Mandatory Disclosure of Inf
Main Subjects
English
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Thesis
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