Document Type : Article

Authors

1 Associate Prof. Department of International Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

2 Ph.D. Student in International Trade and Investment Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Since the beginning of trade liberalization in the 1970s, many financial crises have occurred in various countries. Following the financial crisis of 2008, macroprudential regulation in banking has emerged, emphasizing the importance of overall financial stability rather than the stability of individual banks. Many countries have established a new institution for this regulation, known as the "financial stability council." While most countries have formed such councils, Iran has yet to do so. A new government bill is attempting to establish this council, but its structure is not clearly defined, necessitating further research. Using a descriptive-analytic approach and library sources, we aim to answer the question: how the legal framework for the financial stability council should be designed? Our findings suggest that the financial stability council of Iran should operate independently of the government, the central bank, and the finance ministry. Its members should include representatives from the central bank, the finance ministry, and external experts.

Keywords

Main Subjects

  1. فارسی

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