دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تهران

نوع مقاله : علمی-پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار، گروه حقوق تجارت بین‌الملل، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران

2 دانش آموخته دکتری رشته حقوق نفت و گاز، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران؛ دانش‌آموخته دوره کارشناسی ارشد پیشرفته رشته حقوق مدنی و تجارت بین‌الملل، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه لَیدن، لَیدن، هلند

چکیده

در این مقاله به بررسی تأثیر ضوابط جبران خسارت ناشی از سلب مالکیت در داوری‌های سرمایه‌گذاری بین‌المللی بر ترجیحات دولت‌ها در معاهدات سرمایه‌گذاری و کارامدی آنها از دیدگاه تحلیل اقتصادی حقوق پرداخته شده است. مطالعۀ انجام‌گرفته در این مقاله نشان داد که دولت‌ها در این معاهدات در پی حمایت از سرمایه‌گذاران متبوع خود در قلمرو دولت متعاهد و همچنین توسعۀ اقتصادی کشور خود هستند و قصد دارند با کاهش پیامدهای خارجی اقدامات علیه سرمایه‌گذاران خارجی و همچنین کاهش ریسک سرمایه‌گذاری در قلمرو خود، ترجیحات مذکور را برآورده سازند. در مقایسۀ ضابطۀ ترمیم کامل خسارت در حقوق بین‌الملل عرفی با ضابطۀ مندرج در معاهدات که اغلب پرداخت غرامت فوری، کافی و مؤثر در زمانی پیش از سلب مالکیت است، مشخص شد که معیار ترمیم کامل خسارت تطابق کمتری با ترجیحات دولت‌ها دارد، ازاین‌رو در همه حال کارامد نیست.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Compensation for Expropriation of Foreign Investments from the Perspective of Economic Analysis of Law

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohammadali Bahmaei 1
  • Hassan Faraj Mehrabi 2

1 Assistant Prof., Department of International Commercial Law, Faculty of Law, University of Shahid Beheshti, Tehran, Iran

2 Ph.D. in Oil and Gas Law, Faculty of Law, University of Shahid Beheshti, Tehran, Iran and MA. in International Civil and Commercial Law (Advanced LL.M.), Faculty of Law, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands

چکیده [English]

This article discusses how the standard of compensation for expropriation of foreign investments employed by international investment tribunals can affect State parties’ preferences reflected in international investment agreements as well as the efficiency of these standards in light of an economic analysis of law. It is suggested that State parties to these agreements often pursue their own economic development as well as protecting their nationals who invest in the territory of the other contracting State. In so doing, the State parties try to diminish the externalities associated with their measures and decisions on foreign investors on the one hand, and to reduce the risk of investment in their territory for foreign investors, on the other. By comparing the standard of full reparation established in customary international law to the standard of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation due immediately before the expropriation, usually agreed upon in investment agreements, this article concludes that the former standard -i.e. the standard of full reparation- is not entirely compatible with the preferences of State parties to international investment agreements and, thus, cannot always be considered as an efficient standard.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • compensation
  • Externalities
  • Economic analysis of law
  • Expropriation
  • Chorzów Factory Standard
  • Hull Formula
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